Category Archives: Injunctions

Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v McNicol (No 2) [2013] QSC 329

Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v McNicol (No 2) [2013] QSC 329 (25 November 2013)

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Flanagan and Handcock [2000] FamCa 150

Flanagan and Handcock [2000] FamCA 150 (2 March 2000).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FamCA/2000/150.html

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Patrick Stevedores v MUA [1998] HCA 30

ON THIS DAY in 1998, the High Court of Australia delivered Patrick Stevedores v MUA [1998] HCA 30; 195 CLR 1; 72 ALJR 873; 79 IR 339; 153 ALR 643 (4 May 1998).

The High Court rejected Patrick’s appeal to overturn orders of the Federal Court arising from the waterfront dispute of Easter 1998.

Patrick had locked out its national workforce of about 1400 permanent and 300 part time staff and sought to terminate them on the grounds that their services were no longer required as they were employed by four labour hire companies (restructured in September 1997) that had ceased trading and had been placed under administration whilst Patrick had been involved in the organisation of a non-unionised alternative.

The MUA obtained Federal Court interim injunctions to maintain the pre-Easter status quo and stop the terminations. The effect of the injunctions was to require the specific performance of contracts of service, a remedy which the courts generally do not favour. However, the MUA satisfied the Federal Court that the balance of convenience favoured the relief sought chiefly through undertakings that the workers would refrain from industrial action and not hold the administrators personally liable for their wages and other benefits.

The High Court upheld the Federal Court orders and granted further orders to allow the administrators to properly exercise their functions.

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Re Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green [1984] HCA 82

Re Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green [1984] HCA 82; (1984) 156 CLR 185 (6 December 1984).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/156clr185.html

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Mullane v Mullane [1983] HCA 4

Mullane v Mullane [1983] HCA 4; (1983) 158 CLR 436 (23 February 1983).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/158clr436.html

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Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24

ON 11 MAY 1982, the High Court of Australia delivered Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337 (11 May 1982).

Codelfa contracted with the State Rail Authority’s predecessor, the NSW Commissioner for Railways, to perform the excavations on Sydney’s Eastern Suburbs railway. It was agreed that Codelfa would perform three shifts per day over a fixed period, but they were unable to meet this requirement because of injunctions brought by local residents.

Codelfa sought damages from the SRA on two grounds: (1) that there was an implied term that if they were restrained by injunctions the SRA would extend time for completion or would indemnify Codelfa for any losses caused by the injunctions; in the alternative, (2) that the contract was frustrated by the injunctions.

Mason J at 352 observed that the “true rule” regarding the admission of evidence of the surrounding circumstances is that such evidence is admissible if the language of the contract is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning but is not admissible to contradict the language which has a plain meaning.

The court held that there was no implied term. Even if a term needed to be implied to give efficacy to the contract, the was not a term “so obvious it goes without saying”. The court referred with approval to its earlier decision in Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 51; (1979) 144 CLR 596.

Codelfa was nevertheless successful with the court holding that the contract was frustrated because “the performance of the contract in the events which have occurred is radically different from performance of the contract in the circumstances which it, construed in the light of surrounding circumstances, contemplated”.

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Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper [1981] HCA 1

Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper [1981] HCA 1; (1981) 148 CLR 337 (2 February 1981).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/148clr337.html

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R v Dovey; Ex parte Ross [1979] HCA 14

R v Dovey; Ex parte Ross [1979] HCA 14; (1979) 141 CLR 526 (3 April 1979).

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/141clr526.html

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Miller v Jackson [1977] EWCA Civ 6

ON 6 APRIL 1977, the England and Wales Court of Appeal delivered Miller v Jackson [1977] EWCA Civ 6 (06 April 1977).  A cricket club was sued in negligence and nuisance caused by cricket balls landing on a neighbour’s property.  Whilst ordering damages, the court refused to grant an injunction to cease the action or further action as the game of cricket itself was considered to be in the public interest.

Lord Denning began with the following:

“In summertime village cricket is the delight of everyone. Nearly every village has its own cricket field where the young men play and the old men watch. In the village of Lintz in County Durham they have their own ground, where they have played these last seventy years. They tend it well. The wicket area is well rolled and mown. The outfield is kept short. It has a good club-house for the players and seats for the onlookers. The village team play there on Saturdays and Sundays. They belong to a league, competing with the neighbouring villages. On other evenings after work they practice while the light lasts. Yet now after these 70 years a Judge of the High Court has ordered that they must not play there anymore, lie has issued an injunction to stop them. He has done it at the instance of a newcomer who is no lover of cricket. This newcomer has built, or has had built for him, a house on the edge of the cricket ground which four years ago was a field where cattle grazed. The animals did not mind the cricket. But now this adjoining field has been turned into a housing estate. The newcomer bought one of the houses on the edge of the cricket ground. No doubt the open space was a selling point. Now he complains that, when a batsman hits a six, the ball has been known to land in his garden or on or near his house. His wife has got so upset about it that they always go out at weekends. They do not go into the garden when cricket is being played. They say that this is intolerable. So they asked the Judge to stop the cricket being played. And the Judge, I am sorry to say, feels that the cricket must be stopped: with the consequences, I suppose, that the Lintz cricket-club will disappear. The cricket ground will be turned to some other use. I expect for more houses or a factory. The young men will turn to other things instead of cricket. The whole village will be much the poorer. And all this because of a newcomer who has just bought a house there next to the cricket ground.”

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1977/6.html

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